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The Optimal Scope of Physicians’ Duty to
Protect Patients’ Privacy
†

Ronen Avraham &
††
Joachim Meyer
On March 24, 2015, French air traffic control lost radio
contact with Germanwings Flight 9525 shortly after the air1
craft reached a height of about 6,000 feet. Andreas Lubitz, the
co-pilot of the aircraft, had locked himself in the cockpit and
was leading the aircraft on a fatal descent from its cruising al2
titude of 38,000 feet. The pilot, who left Lubitz alone in the
cockpit while taking a bathroom break, attempted to hack
through the locked cockpit door with an axe while futilely
3
screaming at Lubitz to open the door. Flight 9525 crashed in a
4
remote area in the French Alps, killing all 150 people on board.
Post-crash investigations revealed that Lubitz had been treated
for severe depression and suicidal tendencies, and that Lubitz
even took a break from the Lufthansa flight school to treat a
5
serious depressive episode. In fact, Lubitz consulted forty-one
† University of Texas at Austin (ravraham@law.utexas.edu).
†† Tel Aviv University (jmeyer@post.tau.ac.il). Copyright © 2016 by Ronen Avraham & Joachim Meyer.
1. Krishnadev Calamur, As Night Falls, Officials Call off Search Operation for German Plane, NPR (Mar. 24, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2015/03/24/395011737/germanwings-a320-crashes-in
-french-alps.
2. Dan Bilefsky & Nicola Clark, Fatal Descent of Germanwings Plane
Was ‘Deliberate,’ French Authorities Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/world/europe/germanwings-crash.html.
3. Raphaelle Logerot & Kate Millar, The Germanwings Pilot Left for the
Bathroom and Came Back Shouting ‘Open the D--- Door’, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-alps-crash-captain
-shouted-open-the-damn-door-2015-3.
4. Id.
5. Associated Press, Germanwings Flight 4U9525: Flight School Knew of
Depressive Episode, CBC (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/
germanwings-flight-4u9525-flight-school-knew-of-depressive-episode-1
.3015984. Lufthansa, Germanwings’ parent company, knew of the serious depressive episode as Lubitz informed Lufthansa of the incident and that it had
subsided in an email. Id. Lufthansa cleared Lubitz to fly after Lubitz passed
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doctors over a five-year period, and visited doctors seven times
6
in the month leading up to the crash. Investigators even found
a torn-up sick note Lubitz received from a doctor that would
7
have kept him off work the day of the crash. However this information was not disclosed to Lufthansa because of strict
8
German medical confidentiality rules.
Although the investigation into Flight 9525 continues, it is
clear that third parties had evidence of Lubitz’s battle with depression before Lubitz deliberately crashed the aircraft. Still,
there remains the pressing question of who should have been
warned about Lubitz’s sensitive medical details. Certainly a
warning about Lubitz’s suicidal tendencies would have been
useful to the pilot who left Lubitz alone in the cockpit, or to the
rest of Flight 9525’s flight crew. Should the families of Flight
9525’s passengers win a lawsuit against Lubitz’s doctors for not
disclosing his medical history to the airline? Revealing a pilot’s
medical history under any disclosure policy could impose the
unintended effect of disincentivizing the pilot’s desire to seek
treatment in the first place. A policy that would levy an outright ban on pilots who had any history of mental illness would
invite a similar chilling effect. What the story of Germanwings
Flight 9525 confirms is that the proper theoretical balance between patient privacy and third party safety can have disas9
trous, real-world implications.
When discussing the optimal scope of the duty to protect
patients’ privacy, the literature compares two incommensuraall his medical checks. Id.
6. William Horobin & Stacy Meichtry, Germanwings Crash Probe Widens Beyond Co-Pilot Andreas Lubitz, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2015), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/germanwings-co-pilot-andreas-lubitz-feared-losing-vision
-prosecutor-1434043118.
7. Associated Press, supra note 5.
8. Richard Weiss et al., Medical Privacy Rules Let Germanwings Co-Pilot
Conceal Illness, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-03-29/medical-privacy-rules-let-germanwings-co-pilot-conceal
-illness.
9. An investigatory task force impaneled by European Commissioner for
Transport Violeta Bulc has recommended looser medical privacy protections
for all commercial aviators in response to the Germanwings crash. Robert
Wall & Andy Pasztor, Germanwings Task Force Urges Enhanced Screening of
Pilots, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanwings
-task-force-wants-ehanced-screening-of-pilots-1437127381. German Medical
and aviation associations have previously rejected calls to relax existing confidentially rules. Caroline Copley, Germanwings Crash Triggers Debate on Confidentiality Taboo, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-france-crash-germany-confidentiality-idUSKBN0MR2CT20150331.
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ble interests: privacy and safety. Policymakers face a difficult
task when trying to find an optimal solution, balancing these
two, often conflicting, interests. For example, a major goal of
the federal health privacy standards under the Health Insur10
ance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was to ensure that health information is properly protected while allowing the use of such information to promote high-quality health
11
research and care. Critics point out that the HIPAA Privacy
Rule is unsuccessful in reaching this benchmark: the Rule creates barriers to research which result in biased research samples while simultaneously failing to incorporate comprehensive
12
patient privacy protections. Thus HIPPA rules, though seeking an optimal balance between privacy and safety interests,
fall short on both fronts. Similar privacy and safety trade-off
debates arise in topics as diverse as the increased use of bio13
14
metric surveillance technologies, to software system design,
15
and to government data collection practices. As long as our society continues to value both interests, the debate is sure to attach itself to shifting technological, social, and political norms.
In this Article, we confront the trade-off between patient
confidentiality and public safety as manifested in the legal duty
to warn or report potentially harmful patient behavior. The incommensurability problem seems to plague the analysis of the
10. “The HIPPA Privacy Rule set[s] forth detailed regulations regarding
the types of uses and disclosures of individuals’ personally identifiable health
information” by health plans, healthcare providers, and health care clearinghouses. INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 1–2 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds.,
2009), http://www.nap.edu/read/12458/chapter/2.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See generally Kevin W. Bowyer, Face Recognition Technology: Security
Versus Privacy, IEEE TECH. & SOC'Y MAG., Spring 2004, at 15–16 (discussing
the privacy and safety concerns involved in the use of facial recognition software in public areas).
14. See generally Golnaz Elahi & Eric Yu, Modeling and Analysis of Security Trade-Offs–a Goal Oriented Approach, 68 DATA & KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 579 (2009) (discussing the trade-off between user anonymity and user authentication and auditability in software system design).
15. E.g., John McLaughlin, NSA Intelligence-Gathering Programs Keep
Us Safe, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
nsa-intelligence-gathering-programs-keep-us-safe/2014/01/02/0fd51b22-7173
-11e3-8b3f-b1666705ca3b_story.html. The former acting CIA Director and 30year veteran of the agency argues that information collected by the National
Security Administration (NSA) does no more to affect privacy than information gathered by private companies, yet serves as a key tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. Id.
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two interests: what comparable rudiment do privacy and public
safety share in the duty to warn or report context? We develop
a model which solves this problem by finding the optimal balance between protecting patients’ privacy (as a means to encourage patients to seek treatment, thus reducing risk in society) and warning third parties or the state (again, as a means to
reduce risk in society).
Patients seeking effective medical treatment often depend
on privacy. Without it, patients may prefer to avoid treatment,
and their untreated condition may pose greater safety risks
than the same condition when treated. Thus privacy and safety
are not complementary, and increasing one will necessarily
lower the other. However, there may be more complex relations
between the two, where limiting privacy may also impair safety. Since we compare safety-safety rather than privacy-safety,
we can hone in on an optimal balance of both the privacy and
safety interest through an intuitive, objective, and applicable
quantitative framework rather than just balancing the two interests to reach an arbitrary equilibrium. The safety-safety
formulation thus avoids the difficulties inherent in the apples16
to-oranges privacy-safety comparison.
Our model shows that imposing an unqualified duty to report or warn might result in an increase in the dangerousness
of the primary behavior society is concerned about, such as piloting, driving, or violent acts. Developing a formula not much
17
more complicated than the Hand formula, we show how the
chilling effect and the effectiveness of the medical treatment
should be factors that courts consider when imposing a duty on
medical professionals to report their patients to the state or en18
forcing a duty to warn third parties.
16. See NEIL ROBINSON ET AL., SECURITY, AT WHAT COST? QUANTIFYING
PEOPLE’S TRADE-OFFS ACROSS LIBERTY, PRIVACY, AND SECURITY 1–14 (2010),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_
TR664.pdf (commenting on the difficulty of designing frameworks which allow
scholars to quantify the extent which people may be willing to give up the
right to privacy for greater safety).
17. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).
18. At a more general level, the model we propose here differs somewhat
from most models developed in the context of law and economics. Most economic models adopt game theoretical approaches, computing equilibrium predictions for different legal settings. The approach we take resembles an engineering model. The idea is not to come up with exact predictions about
individual actors’ actions, but rather to specify the minimal conditions at
which a solution will achieve the desired outcomes. Whether these conditions
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Consider the following scenarios: In scenario (1), an epileptic individual has a seizure while driving, causing an accident
and injuring another motorist. The injured motorist brings a
tort action against the epileptic individual’s doctor for negligently treating his epileptic patient, for example, by failing to
warn him to not drive. The court holds that the doctor could potentially be held liable to the motorist (a third party). In scenario (2), a male patient of a university clinic reveals his intention to kill a specific woman to one of the university’s
psychologists. The psychologist warns the university police, but
does not warn the woman. The patient, feeling betrayed by the
psychologist, does not go back to therapy, and later kills the
woman. The woman’s parents bring a suit against the psychologist, and the court holds that the psychologist could be
held liable for not warning the woman even though he was not
negligent towards his patient. In scenario (3), a state statute
imposes a duty on doctors to report pilots that have dangerous
diseases such as heart diseases or severe depression.
Do these three scenarios have anything in common? Scenarios (1) and (2) deal with the problem known in tort law as
“duty of care towards third parties.” Scenario (1) deals with the
question of whether a doctor should be held liable towards unidentified third parties who are victims of a dangerous patient
when the doctor was only negligent towards his own patient.
19
That was the question in the famous case of Duvall. Scenario
(2) deals with the duty towards identified third parties (victims
of the doctor’s patient) when the doctor was not negligent towards his dangerous patient. That was the question in the fa20
mous case of Tarasoff. Scenario (3) deals with the statutory
requirement to report certain dangerous patients, such as
Lubitz, to the state.
Despite the doctrinal differences, all three cases deal with
a similar theoretical problem. Indeed, all three challenge us to
think about the optimal scope of a medical provider’s duty to
will be met or not will depend on a variety of factors, including the economic
incentives of the different actors, the alternatives open for them, etc. Decision
makers who have to decide on the implementation of certain legal policies can
take these specifications of minimal conditions into account when considering
whether the actions are likely to lead to the desired outcomes.
19. See Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275, 276, 279 (1984) (addressing the
doctor’s potential negligence in failing to properly treat his patient for his epileptic seizures and failing to warn him not to drive).
20. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340, 342–51
(Cal. 1976).
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protect their patients’ privacy on the one hand, and their conflicting duty to report their dangerous patients to third party
victims (whether identified like in Tarasoff, or unidentified like
in Duvall) or to the state on the other hand.
The goal of this paper is to conceptualize the major relevant considerations for defining the optimal scope of the duty to
protect patients’ privacy in light of the conflicting duties to
warn third parties or to report dangerous patients to the state.
Conventional wisdom held by courts and scholars alike allows doctors to violate their patients’ confidentiality and imposes a duty towards third parties based primarily on the notion of foreseeability, or reasonable anticipation that harm or
injury is a likely result of the patient’s words or acts. The more
likely the harm is to occur, the more physicians are expected to
break confidentiality, especially if the victim is identifiable.
However, as we show in this paper, there are three other critical considerations to which many courts and legal commentators have not given enough thought. The first consideration is
the chilling effect such a duty will have on patients’ incentives
to seek treatment from physicians and psychiatrists. Second,
and importantly, is the effect that the lack of medical treatment will have on the riskiness of the primary behavior of concern (e.g. driving, killing, and flying). Third, and relatedly, is
the effectiveness of the medical treatment in improving the patient’s condition and its impact on the primary behavior of concern.
We present a model that delivers a very simple yet overlooked intuition: the optimal scope of the duty to warn third
parties, or to report certain patients to the state, should take
into account not only (1) the probability of harm to others by
the patient, but also (2) the likely success of treatment by doctors and the treatment’s impact on the behavior of concern, as
well as (3) the chilling effect such a duty will have on patients
seeking help, and (4) the impact of that effect on the primary
behavior of concern. We show that, holding all else equal, the
more effective the therapy or treatment is in reducing patients’
riskiness, relative to their riskiness without treatment, and the
larger the chilling effect is, the less society should impose a duty to report or warn. Somewhat counterintuitively, even if the
treatment is only partially successful in reducing patients’ riskiness and still leaves the patients in a psychologically dangerous or physically unhealthy state, it may still be better not to
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impose a duty to warn on physicians if the chilling effect is too
21
great.
Our model has important implications both for torts and
reporting statutes. With respect to tort law, our model provides
courts and legal commentators with a simple formula—not
much more complicated than the Hand formula—on how to
think about the optimal duty owed by physicians. What is now
done in a somewhat arbitrary and erratic way, we propose to
formalize and structure. The major insight is that the optimal
scope is context dependent and might therefore change over
time with advances in medicine. For example, because the current effectiveness of treating dementia is very limited, while
the increase in the risk for accident involvement is substantial
(between two- to eight-fold greater for elderly drivers with mild
22
to moderate dementia versus those not demented), it makes
sense to impose a duty to warn or report on health providers.
By contrast, for seizure disorders, such as epilepsy, the treatment is very effective. The risk of accidents involving emergency department visits when the person adheres to the prescribed
23
anti-epileptic drug treatment is reduced by one-half. In that
situation, to promote road safety, it might well be better to not
impose a duty on the provider.
Moreover, the duty to report or warn might depend on the
stage of the disease, the probability of its cure, and its impact
on the primary behavior’s risks. Thus, doctors might not have a
duty to report or warn third parties when they treat patients
that are in the early stages of HIV, because then the disease is
arguably more treatable, and it is beneficial from a social welfare perspective to not chill patients from seeking help. By contrast, the duty might well be imposed in later stages because
the chilling effect from reporting during those stages is not as
troubling.
One corollary from the model is that the more uncertainty
21. Not taking into account the costs of reporting or warning in terms of
their impact on the primary behavior of concern and only focusing on the
probability of harm is conceptually similar to the mistake scholars and courts
made before acknowledging the costs (B) component in Learned Hand’s famous BPL negligence formula.
22. Laura B. Brown & Brian R. Ott, Driving and Dementia: A Review of
the Literature, J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGY, 232, 232 (2004).
23. E. Faught et al., Nonadherence to Antiepileptic Drugs and Increased
Mortality: Findings from the RANSOM Study, 71 NEUROLOGY 1572, 1575
(2008) (finding that nonadherence to antiepileptic drugs was associated with a
50% higher incidence of emergency department visits versus adherent behavior).
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surrounds the success of the therapy, as is, for example, usually
the case in psychotherapy, the more favorable it becomes for
medical providers to not be required to report, but instead be
afforded discretion as to whether or not to report their patients
to the state. The reasoning is that providers might well be in
the best position to weigh both the costs and the benefits of reporting in terms of its impact on the primary behavior of concern. This insight has significant implications for the debate
about the liability of physicians in Lubitz’s case and in other
important instances such as not reporting child abuse.
Our paper is divided into five parts. Part I details the duty
imposed on doctors to warn or protect both identified and unidentified third parties derived from tort law. Part II discusses a
physician’s duty to report patients who are HIV positive. Part
III outlines the state-imposed duty to report individuals with
certain serious, driving-impairing conditions (usually through
reporting statutes) on physicians. Part IV reviewes empirical
evidence on how consequences for reporting can have chilling
effects on reporting in the first place. Part IV presents a model
for determining the optimal scope of the duty to warn or report.
Part V concludes.
TORT LAW: THE DUTY TO WARN OR PROTECT THIRD
PARTIES FROM “DANGEROUS” PATIENTS
The Restatement (Third) of Torts states that “[a]n actor in
a special relationship with another owes a duty of reasonable
care to third parties with regard to risks posed by the other
24
that arise within the scope of the relationship.” One such special relationship that gives rise to this duty is that of “a mental25
health professional with patients.” After the seminal Tarasoff
26
decision, the Restatement (Third) recognized and adopted the
duty imposed on doctors.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 41(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 2012).
25. Id. § 41(b)(4).
26. The Restatement (Third) outlines the history of the duty to warn announced in the Restatement (Second):
Section 315 of the Second Restatement of Torts stated the general
proposition that there is no affirmative duty to control the conduct of
a third party so as to prevent the third party from causing harm to
another. Subsection (a) provided an exception to that general rule
based on a special relationship between the actor and the third party.
Subsequent Sections elaborated on the relationships that were sufficient to impose such a duty [§§ 316, 317, 319] . . . [t]his Section replaces [these sections] and includes an additional relationship [for
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Tarasoff was a case in which a patient of a hospital killed a
woman he was infatuated with after confiding his intention to
27
kill her to one of the hospital’s psychologists. Although the
doctor in Tarasoff informed the police of his patient’s intentions, the police did not detain him. The doctor, however, did
not warn the victim or any member of her family. Feeling betrayed by the psychologist, the patient did not go back to therapy and later killed the woman. The victim’s parents alleged
that her death was proximately caused by the psychologist’s
negligence in failing to warn the victim or others. The court
held that therapists owe identified third parties a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from serious violent danger when the therapist determines, or pursuant to relevant professional standards should have determined, that the
therapist’s patient poses a serious risk of harm to said third
party of such danger. That duty is usually fulfilled by warning
28
the third party about this risk (“duty to warn”).
Justice Clark dissented and recognized the crucial policy
considerations that weigh against imposing a duty on psycholo29
gists and other mental health professionals in such situations.
Clark warned that such a duty “[w]hile offering virtually no
benefit to society . . . will frustrate psychiatric treatment, in30
vade fundamental patient rights and increase violence.”
Clark’s dissent lamented the effect such a duty would have on
the doctor-patient relationship and the patient’s willingness to
seek treatment, stating that “without substantial assurance of
confidentiality, those requiring treatment will be deterred from
31
seeking assistance.” Alas, only a few other commentators and

mental-health professional and patient].
Id. at cmt. a.
27. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339 (Cal. 1976).
See Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, “Where the Public Peril Begins”: 25
Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 192–96 (2000) for a detailed description of the facts of the case.
28. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340, 350–51 (“The discharge of this duty may
require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the
nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or
others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.”).
29. Id. at 355, 358 (Clark, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 358 (“Overwhelming policy considerations weigh against imposing a duty on psychotherapists to warn a potential victim against harm.”).
31. Id. at 359.
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scholars have also discussed the possible negative effects such a
32
duty would have on effective mental health treatment.
Following Tarasoff, twenty-nine states now require mental
health professionals to warn or protect potential victims about
33
credible threats from their patients. Sixteen states and D.C.
make the duty to protect or warn discretionary (these states
“allow” mental health care professionals to disclose potential
34
danger to third parties). Four states do not impose any duty to
35
protect or warn on mental health care professionals.
Some courts also began to expand Tarasoff’s holding in dif36
ferent ways. One of the broadest interpretations was announced in the case of Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., a case in
which people in a crowded nightclub were attacked with a
shotgun by a psychiatric patient without any advance warn37
ing. The patient was receiving psychiatric treatment from the
hospital and purchased a gun while he was still receiving
38
treatment. Shortly after purchasing the gun, the patient removed himself from treatment against the advice of his doctors
and shot into the crowded nightclub killing a man and injuring
39
his wife. The court in Lipari allowed the plaintiffs to proceed
in their case against the patient’s hospital, thereby rejecting
the Tarasoff limitation of only having a duty towards identifia40
ble victims. The court seemed to impose a duty on therapists
to predict dangerousness, and in addition a duty to protect society from “dangerous” patients.
The court in Duvall (mentioned above) similarly extended
Tarasoff to include a duty to protect the general public (not just
32. See, e.g., Buckner & Firestone, supra note 27, at 200–13 (discussing
the various scholars and some courts that criticized the duty imposed on doctors and how the scope of such duty has been greatly expanded to include not
only mental health care professionals but other doctors as well).
33. Mental Health Professionals’ Duty To Warn, NAT. CONFERENCE ST.
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental
-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Buckner & Firestone, supra note 27, at 200 (listing the broadest
court cases and noting that “[t]he duty to protect, which was enunciated in the
Tarasoff case, was interpreted more broadly by several courts that purported
to follow Tarasoff, so that the duty to protect was not uniform throughout the
United States”).
37. See id.
38. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D. Neb. 1980).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 191.
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specifically identified potential victims) from potentially “dan41
gerous” patients. Duvall went even further than Lipari in two
ways. First, it imposed a duty on mental health care professionals to recognize other general medical conditions such as
epilepsy (not just dangerous propensities of their patients
based on psychiatric problems) and to protect the public from
42
such individuals. Second, it imposed a duty on mental health
care professionals towards unidentified third parties who were
victims of the patient’s negligent (or even faultless) behavior
and not just of the patient’s criminal behavior. However, while
some courts have extended Tarasoff, others have limited its
43
reach.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF HIV
Patients diagnosed with either AIDS or HIV raise interesting dilemmas regarding both the duty to warn third parties and
the duty to report to the state. As will be explained shortly, the
41. Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275, 278–79 (1984).
42. See id. (imposing a duty on the psychiatrist to “treat” his patient’s epilepsy). The court’s position seems to be contrary to the position paper issued
by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1993, in which the APA addressed the “role of psychiatrists in assessing driving ability.” Kristen Snyder
& Joseph D. Bloom, Physician Reporting of Impaired Drivers: A New Trend in
State Law?, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 76, 78 (2004) (discussing Position Statement on the Role of Psychiatrists in Assessing Driving Ability, 152
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 819, 819 (1995) [hereinafter “Position Statement”]). In this
position paper, the APA asserted that although psychiatric patients “may experience symptoms that can interfere with their ability to operate a motor vehicle safely . . . . psychiatrists have no special expertise in assessing the ability
of their patients to drive . . . . [and] should not be expected to make such assessments in the course of clinical practice.” Position Statement, supra.
43. See, for example, Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 626–
30 (1999), in which the court held that an ophthalmologist did not have a duty
to another motorist that was killed in an accident involving his patient. The
court stated that the appellant’s decedent was simply not a foreseeable victim
that the court would recognize. Id. at 630. The court added that it would refuse to stretch foreseeability beyond the point of recognition as doing so would
make liability endless. Id. The court warned that to allow liability in the case
make physicians absolutely liable for the vicarious acts of their patients. Id.;
see also Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 751
F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984) (restricting a therapist’s duty to the “specific threats
to specific persons” rule); Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (D.
Md. 1982) (limiting the duty to protect third parties to only instances where
the therapist had the right to commit his patient); Estate of Votteler v.
Heltsley, 327 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa 1982) (determining that the Tarasoff ruling supports the conclusion that a duty should not be imposed when the foreseeable victim is already aware of the danger). See generally Buckner & Firestone, supra note 27, at 200–13 for a full discussion of various examples in
which courts have both expanded and limited Tarasoff.
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special interest stems from the fact that AIDS is a disease that
advances in stages, and the efficacy of treatment declines sig44
nificantly in each consecutive stage.
All fifty states require physicians to report patients that
have been diagnosed with either AIDS or HIV to local or state
45
health departments. While states previously differed in the
46
requirements for HIV reporting (some requiring name-based
47
48
reporting, some requiring only code-based reporting), all
44. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 17 HIV SURVEILREPORT NO. 3, PT. A, at 9–10 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/
statistics_2010_HIV_Surveillance_Report_vol_17_no_3.pdf. “The advent in
1996 of potent combination antiretroviral therapy (ART), sometimes called
HAART (highly active antiretroviral therapy) or cART (effective combination
antiretroviral therapy), changed the course of the HIV epidemic.” CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THE PREVENTION BENEFITS OF HIV TREATMENT 1 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/
prevention/research/tap/. “These ‘cocktails’ of three or more antiretroviral
drugs used in combination gave patients and scientists new hope for fighting
the epidemic and have significantly improved life expectancy—to decades rather than months.” Id. Previously, no one had conducted a randomized clinical
trial to show that that treating HIV-infected persons also significantly reduced
their risk of transmitting the infection to sexual and drug-using partners who
didn’t have the virus. Id.
That changed in 2011 with the publication of findings from the HIV
Prevention Trials Network (HPTN) 052 study, a randomized clinical
trial designed in part to evaluate whether the early initiation of ART
can prevent the sexual transmission of HIV among heterosexual couples in which one partner is HIV-infected and the other is not. This
landmark study validated that early HIV treatment has a profound
prevention benefit: results showed that the risk of transmitting HIV
to an uninfected partner was reduced by 96%.
Id.
45. Laura Lin & Bryan A. Liang, HIV and Health Law: Striking the Balance Between Legal Mandates and Medical Ethics, AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS
(Oct., 2005), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2005/10/hlaw1-0510.html.
46. “Name-based reporting” requires the physician to report the actual
name of the HIVP patient. See id.
47. “Code-based reporting” simply assigns a certain code to each HIVP
patient instead of using their actual name. See id.
48. See id. (describing the pre-Ryan White CARE Act 2006 amendment
status of HIV state reporting systems in which “forty-three state . . . health
departments . . . implemented confidential name-based HIV reporting, while
approximately 14 other state and local health departments use[d] code-based
or name-to-code reporting methods”). The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS
Resources Emergency (CARE) Act provided states funding for individuals affected by AIDS/HIV. See Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–381, 104 Stat. 576 (1990) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 300 et seq. (2012)), https://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-104/pdf/STATUTE-104-Pg576.pdf. The Act was
amended in 2006, changing the manner in which states were designated for
federal funding; giving states that did not have a name-based system of HIV
LANCE
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states have now moved to a name-based reporting system. No
state takes the stage of the HIV into account in their reporting
requirements: all states require reporting HIV at any stage
50
when it is detected. Despite the trend towards name-based reporting, the arguments against such reporting did not escape
some states’ eyes. States that were opposed to name-based reporting systems, such as California, did not want to impose
name-based reporting because the states “were concerned that
reporting names might discourage people from testing, particu51
larly the people at highest risk for HIV infection.” Other
states “feared that reporting names would deter treatment,
52
since reporting also occurs when clients access medical care.”
As the American Medical Association (AMA) notes:
Public policy encourages high-risk groups to submit to
HIV testing because those individuals who know they
are HIV positive are more likely to seek treatment
and take precautions that may prevent transmission
of the virus. However, if HIV-related information is
readily disclosed by health care providers, individuals
53
may become more reluctant to seek testing.
While one study conducted in New York seems to indicate
that HIV name-based reporting does not affect patients’ decisions to seek treatment, there is little research in this area, and
the effects on patients of reporting at different stages of HIV
54
have not been well documented or studied thus far.
status reporting a substantially less amount of federal funding. See Ryan
White HIV/AIDS Treatment Modernization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–415,
120 Stat. 2767 (2006) (codified in scattered scetions of 42 U.S.C. § 300
et seq. (2012)), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ415/pdf/PLAW
-109publ415.pdf.
49. See State HIV Laws, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/states/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). There
are twenty-five states that also have “HIV-specific criminal laws.” See HIVSpecific Criminal Laws, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www .cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/states/exposure.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2016).
50. See State HIV Laws, supra note 49.
51. HIV NAME-BASED REPORTING, 15 HIV COUNSELOR PERSPECTIVES NO.
3, at 1, 1 (2006), http://ahppublications.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/persp1006
.pdf.
52. Id.
53. Lin & Liang, supra note 45.
54. See James M. Tesoriero et al., The Effect of Name-Based Reporting
and Partner Notification on HIV Testing in New York State, 98 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 728 (2008) (finding that “[h]igh risk individuals had limited awareness of the reporting and notification law, and few cited concern about named
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With respect to the tort duty to warn, several states have
declined to impose Tarasoff’s “duty to warn” on physicians in
HIV-patient cases. For example, Iowa has adopted a statute
explicitly stating that, “[t]his subsection shall not be interpreted
to create a duty to warn third parties of the danger of exposure
to HIV through contact with a person who tests positive for
55
HIV infection.” Additionally, both Alabama and Arizona have
statutes that shield doctors from liability both if they do and do
56
not disclose an HIV-positive patient’s status to their partners.
One arguable exception is Reisner v. Regents of University
of California, an HIV-patient case, in which the California
Court of Appeals purported to extend Tarasoff’s holding to a
57
case involving HIV disclosure. In Reisner, the plaintiff sued
his girlfriend’s physician for negligence because the physician
did not inform the patient that the blood used in a transfusion
conducted on his girlfriend five years before was contaminated
with HIV when the physician found out (a day after the sur58
gery). The plaintiff, who was intimate with the patient about
59
three years after the surgery, contracted HIV. The plaintiff
claimed that the physician owed him a duty to warn his girl60
friend, the physician’s patient, that the blood had HIV. However, this situation is different from Tarasoff and in fact quite
similar to Duvall. While in Tarasoff, the Court held that the
physician owed a third party a duty to warn the third party
herself about his patient’s dangerous propensities, even though
the physician was not negligent towards the patient, in Reisner
(and Duvall) the court held that the physician owed a third
party a duty to warn the physician’s own patient about his pa-

reporting as a reason for avoiding or delaying HIV testing. HIV testing levels
. . . among those who tested HIV positive were not affected by the law”).
55. IOWA CODE § 141A.5(2)(c)(2) (2015) (emphasis added).
56. The Arizona statute states: “This section does not impose a duty to
disclose information. A doctor of medicine is not civilly or criminally liable for
either disclosing or not disclosing information.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1457(A)
(2015). The Alabama statute states “No physician . . . shall incur any civil or
criminal liability for revealing or failing to reveal confidential information
within the approved rules.” ALA. CODE § 22-11A-38(f) (2015).
57. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“Tarasoff dictates the
result in our case by holding that the doctors duty includes duty to warn ‘others likely to apprise the victim of the danger . . . or take whatever . . . steps are
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.’”).
58. Id. at 519.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 520.
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tient’s dangerous condition. Other cases, similar to Reisner,
61
have held the same.
Indeed, there have not been any cases—known to us—
where a court has imposed liability on a physician for failing to
warn a third party whom he knows may have been exposed to
HIV by his patient if the patient himself has already been noti62
fied. This interpretation of the Tarasoff duty is unique to HIV
61. Id.; see also Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt Univ., 62 S.W.3d 133, 138
(Tenn. 2001) (“The duty contemplated here is not one to warn [the affected
third party] himself of [the patient’s] exposure to HIV but to warn [the patient] so that she might take adequate precautions to prevent transmission of
the disease to [a third party] and their child.”); C.W. v. Cooper Health System,
906 A.2d 440, 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (“The question is not
whether defendants have a duty to notify [the affected party] directly of [the
patient’s] HIV test results. The duty of care to a third party . . . requires the
health care provider to take all reasonable measures to notify the patient of
the results of his HIV test . . . . Thus, the harm to [the affected party] flows
from [the patient’s] ignorance of his own health status, not from [the hospital’s] failure to notify [the affected party] of [the patient’s] medical condition.”).
62. See Lin & Liang, supra note 45 (“[T]o date, attempts to create a duty
for physicians to protect endangered third parties in HIV cases have been unsuccessful”); Thomas Bradley et al., Legal Issues Associated with Disclosure of
Patient’s HIV-Positive Status to Third Parties, THE BODY, http://www.thebody
.com/content/art33211.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) (similarly noting that
“[i]n addition to statutory regulation on this issue, providers should be aware
that there may be a common law legal duty imposed on them to protect third
parties when their patients refuse to notify their contacts of their HIV-positive
status. Currently, no such duty has been firmly established by law.” (emphasis
added)); see also Santa Rosa Health Care Corp. v. Garcia, 964 S.W.2d 940, 944
(Tex. 1998) (“[The hospital] had no statutory or common-law duty to notify
[the patient’s wife] that she was at risk of contracting the HIV virus from [the
patient].”); Lemon v. Stewart, 682 A.2d 1177, 1181 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(“None of the cases that we cited for that proposition involved a duty to inform
a third person that the patient was HIV-positive or had AIDS . . . . No case has
been cited to us imposing a common law duty on the part of a health care provider to inform persons other than the provider’s patient of the patient’s positive HIV status, and we have found none.”). Note also N.O.L. v. District of Columbia, 674 A.2d 498 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995), a case in which a husband brought
suit against D.C. for failing to notify him that his wife tested positive for HIV.
The court held that “the District (i.e., its employees at Saint Elizabeth's Hospital) owed appellant no duty to disclose his wife’s HIV-positive test results. On
the contrary, the hospital staff owed a duty to appellant’s wife to refrain from
disclosing that information to anyone, including her husband, without her
written consent (or court order).” Id. at 499 (citing to D.C. Code § 6-117(b)(1)
(1995)). See also Lemon, 682 A.2d at 1178, a case in which several of the patient’s family members and friends who had “personal contact with” the patient brought suit against patient’s physician for his failure to notify plaintiffs
of patient’s HIV-positive status. The court held the physician did not owe patient’s family and friends a duty to inform them of patient’s HIV status. Id. at
1184–85 (“There is no doubt that [the physician] had a duty, under common
law and by statute, to inform [the patient] of his positive HIV status . . . . The
issue is whether appellants can base their causes of action on the breach of a

Avraham & Meyer_2fmt

2016]

OPTIMAL SCOPE OF PHYSICIAN’S DUTY

45

cases. In these instances, courts have considered the importance of privacy to outweigh the other interests—
presumably since those with HIV are less likely to act against
third parties with malice as a result of their condition, and are
not likely to place others in immediate fatal danger, as we will
see in the next section.
STATE STATUTORY LAW AND DOCTORS’ DUTY TO
REPORT IMPAIRED DRIVERS
Many states have various laws requiring physicians to report to the state people whose medical conditions might put
63
others in danger, such as pilots, ship captains, or pedophiles.
For simplicity this section focuses on drivers, although similar
considerations apply in the other cases as well. Indeed, most
states have enacted laws requiring physicians to report individuals with certain serious medical conditions that will impair
their driving to the state’s respective vehicle or motor depart64
ments. For example, California requires physicians to report
only those medical conditions that are “characterized by lapses
65
of consciousness.” Oregon requires physicians to report individuals whose “cognitive or functional impairment affects that
66
person’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.” Nevada’s
duty to [the patient]. We conclude that they cannot.”).
63. See Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatrists To
Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449, 450–
51 (1991).
64. See Lee Black, Health Law: Physicians’ Legal Responsibility to Report
Impaired Drivers, 10 VIRTUAL MENTOR 393, 393–94 (2008); see also Snyder &
Bloom, supra note 42, at 77–78 (discussing some of these state laws). For examples of statutes concerning a physician’s duty to report drivers with certain
impairing medical conditions, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103900
(2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-112 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-311
(2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 483.800 (2015); ORE. REV. STAT. § 807.710 (2013);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-303 (2015). The American Medical Association’s
(AMA) Ethical and Judicial Affairs Council has also issued an opinion containing several recommendations for physicians and their duty to report patients
with serious medical, driving-impairing conditions. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Opinion 2.24: Impaired Drivers and Their Physicians, AM. MED.
ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/
code-medical-ethics/opinion224.page? (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). The opinion
states that “[p]hysicians should assess patients’ physical or mental impairments that might adversely affect driving abilities” and that “[t]he purpose of
[the] report is to articulate physicians’ responsibility to recognize impairments
in patients’ driving ability that pose a strong threat to public safety and which
ultimately may need to be reported to the Department of Motor Vehicles.” Id.
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103900(a) (2015).
66. ORE. REV. STAT. § 807.710(2)(a) (2013).
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statute provides that “hospitals, medical clinics, and similar institutions which treat persons who are blind, night-blind or
whose vision is severely impaired” must report such persons to
67
the state. Both Montana and Minnesota’s statutes, on the other hand, are more flexible and make reporting discretionary.
For example, the Montana statute states that a “physician who
diagnoses a physical or mental condition that, in the physician’s judgment, will significantly impair a person’s ability to
safely operate a motor vehicle may voluntarily report” such an
68
individual.
The situation bares the characteristics of a social dilemma
in the sense that there is a conflict between the interests of an
individual and the interests of the group to which the individual belongs. Society may prefer that people with medical problems that negatively affect road safety not drive, because they
may endanger themselves or others. The main concern, however, is the chilling effect: drivers who are worried that they may
have a medical problem that will cause them to lose their driver’s license may choose not to report that problem to their physician. Consequently, the medical problem will remain untreated, possibly leading to even greater safety problems, including
increased morbidity and mortality. Of course, whether the
chilling effect is substantial is an empirical question, which the
next section discusses.
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CHILLING EFFECTS
Evidence suggests that people may fail to report a medical
problem if they believe that reporting the problem will result in
negative consequences for them. For instance, there is ample
evidence that pilots who have to fill out a medical report to renew their pilot license hide information about their medical
problems. In an early study, postmortem toxicology analyses of
general aviation pilots showed forty-eight cases with possibly
incapacitating conditions: thirteen cardiovascular (three reported), seven neurological (none reported), twenty-eight psy69
chiatric (none reported). More recently, in a sample of 40,000
67. NEV. REV. STAT. § 483.800 (2015).
68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-311(1) (2015) (emphasis added); see also
MINN. STAT. § 171.131 (2015).
69. OFFICE OF AVIATION MED., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., REPORT NO.
DOT/FAA/AM-94/14, UNREPORTED MEDICATIONS USED IN INCAPACITATING
MEDICAL CONDITIONS FOUND IN FATAL CIVIL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 2 (1994),
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/1
990s/media/AM94-14.pdf.
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airmen certificate-holders, the Inspector General found more
than 3,200 airmen holding current medical certificates while
simultaneously receiving Social Security benefits, including
70
those for medically disabling conditions.
Fear of losing one’s driving license is another concern
71
which may lead people to refrain from seeking therapy. The
problem also extends to commercial drivers who rely on their
licenses for their careers and thus have an added incentive to
refrain from reporting conditions. Data from a study of drivers
suffering from sleep apnea led the lead researchers to hypothesize that commercial drivers may be less likely to report their
72
sleepiness in order to protect their job. A similar problem exists in mental health. Data show that about twenty-five percent
of psychotherapy clients drop out after a report is made, without accounting for those who psychologically drop out and close
down (this figure came from agency psychotherapy and does
73
not account for private practice). Those who do remain in
treatment after a report is made often become guarded and lose
trust in their therapist, requiring several weeks or more to re74
pair the fragile relationship.
The chilling effect of mandatory reporting laws has been
specifically noted in research related to child abuse. For example, on July 1, 1988, Maryland’s amendment to a statute requiring reporting of child sexual abuse disclosed by adult pa75
tients seeking treatment became effective. The rate of
disclosure at a particular Maryland clinic between January 1,
1984 and July 1, 1988, when there was no duty to report re70. Falsification of FAA Airman Medical Certificate Applications by Disability Recipients: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on
Transp. and Infrastructure, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Calvin L.
Scovel, III, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation), https://
www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/SAFE_PILOT_Testimony_july17.pdf.
71. See Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Diabetes and Driving, 35 DIABETES CARE
S81, S84 (2012) (noting reluctance to seek treatment due to fear of losing one’s
license in the context of mandated physician reporting); M.C. Salinsky et al.,
Epilepsy, Driving Laws, and Patient Disclosure to Physicians, 33 EPILEPSIA
469, 470 (1992) (finding that patients with epilepsy may not report seizures for
fear of losing their license to drive).
72. See Commercial Drivers Could Be Understating Sleep Apnea
Symptoms for Fear of Losing Their License, SCI. DAILY (Aug. 26, 2012), http://
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/08/120826143352.htm.
73. Murray Levine, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandated
Reporting of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 711, 730 (1993).
74. See id. at 732–33.
75. Berlin et al., supra note 63, at 450.
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76

lapses during treatment, was around two per month. Between
July 1, 1988 and the end of 1990 (when the research was accepted for publication), the rate of these disclosures dropped to
zero, while the rate of disclosures for offenses that did not require reporting (not involving children) did not drop off during
77
that same period. This suggests that potentially abused children went unidentified because offenders did not want to disclose their behavior and risk being reported. In addition, the
clinic showed that seventy-three self-referred patients who had
previous sexual activity with children entered treatment be78
tween January 1, 1979 and July 1, 1989. This rate of about
one patient seeking treatment every two months dropped to zero during the following year, suggesting that individuals who
would have sought help prior to the enactment of the law no
longer sought to remedy their pedophilia for fear of being reported.
THE OPTIMAL DUTY TO WARN AND REPORT
Courts and commentators have mainly taken into account
the foreseeability of the risk of the patient to third parties as
the most relevant factor to consider when establishing a duty to
79
report or warn. Courts and commentators have occasionally
also considered the chilling effect that imposing such a duty
will have on patients’ willingness to seek therapy. Still, the optimal scope of the duty to warn is quite different. In order to
achieve optimal incentives for both doctors (in treating patients
effectively) and patients (in obtaining health and mental care
treatment), the likelihood of success in treatment and its impact on the primary behavior of concern should be weighed
against the negative deterrent effect such a duty would have on
patients’ motivations to seek help and its implications for the
primary behavior of concern. Thus, for example, if the potential
treatment for certain conditions is very effective, and as a re76. Id. at 451.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 451–52.
79. Describing the doctrine as imposing a duty solely through foreseeability is inaccurate. Courts also check that a care provider assumes control over a
potentially dangerous patient. In Tarasoff the California court used a broad
version of the “control doctrine.” In New York, the “control doctrine” is narrower than in California. Under New York law, control must be physical rather than psychological, and so a psychiatrist who can commit his patient will
have a duty to report, but a psychologist as in Tarasoff will not. See Rivera v.
N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 412, 417–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

Avraham & Meyer_2fmt

2016]

OPTIMAL SCOPE OF PHYSICIAN’S DUTY

49

sult the expected social costs associated with the primary behavior of concern are significantly reduced, the duty placed on
doctors to report and warn should be relaxed so as to not deter
individuals with such treatable conditions from seeking health
care, even if the patients still remain very dangerous after the
treatment.
The next section presents a simple model that captures the
dilemma. The issue can be modeled in a number of ways. One
way is to develop a game-theoretical model that provides the
equilibrium calculations for decision makers who have to decide
whether to seek medical treatment for their condition, considering that they may lose their driver’s license if their physician
reports them. Such a model needs to specify the utilities of various factors, such as the benefits derived from continued driving and the treatment for the medical problem. These, in turn,
depend on numerous factors, including the availability of alternatives to driving (public transportation, a spouse with a license, etc.), the need for a car to access services (inner city residents will need a car less than people living in rural areas), the
medical status of the individual, and other factors. Alternatively one can develop a simple decision analytic model that specifies the minimal conditions in which a policy that requires physicians to report medical problems can be beneficial. We
adopted this latter approach.
In our model we only deal with the probabilities for accident involvement with and without medical treatment for a
medical problem, and with and without the enforcement of the
duty to report. We focus on patients’ decision to seek care as a
function of the duty to report or warn. We hold constant other
possible factors that might influence patients’ decisions. For
example, we ignore the effectiveness of the treatment for reducing accident involvement on patients’ decisions to seek care. Also, patients are likely to seek care for many reasons, such as to
reduce symptoms, to receive disability benefits, and not necessarily to improve their driving. We also do not deal with any issues that might affect people’s tendency to report a medical issue, such as privacy concerns. The model instead focuses on the
population and does not address physicians’ decisions. For example, physicians might “diagnose” patients as suffering from
something other than epilepsy to avoid having to report their
patients (either because they want to save the personal inconvenience involved or to protect their patients from losing their
driving license). Our model, in contrast, focuses on the impact

Avraham & Meyer_2fmt

50

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[Vol 100

of care seeking on accident likelihood. We focus primarily on
the impact of the legal duty to report or warn, which is why
this is the only moving part in our model.
Thus, we provide an answer to the following question: given the effectiveness of a treatment in reducing accidents among
people with a medical problem, what is the maximal chilling effect, after the duty to report is imposed, up to which the law
has a positive effect (in terms of reduced probability for a car
accidents)? If, for instance, a duty to warn third parties or report patients will only have a positive effect if more than ninety
percent of the affected people seek medical treatment, one may
want to consider the implementation of the duty with caution.
The reason is that the chilling effect stemming from imposing
the duty might deter patients from reporting their medical conditions, and as a result the ninety percent threshold will never
be met. Alternatively, if imposing a duty has a beneficial effect
even where only a relatively small percentage of the affected
population seeks medical treatment, the law can more easily be
justified, as even a large chilling effect will not offset the benefits of imposing the duty.
We first model the physician’s scope of duty to report patients’ dangerous driving to the state. Later, we will discuss the
implications for the duty to warn in tort law.
A. THE MODEL
Some notations and definitions:
pA – Probability of accident involvement in the population
pM – Probability of a particular medical problem in the
population
pDrive – Probability that a person with the medical problem
will drive (depends on self-regulation)
pDiagnose – Probability of a physician correctly diagnosing the
medical problem (depends on uniqueness of symptoms, etc.)
pC – Probability that a patient will complain about a particular problem
pCne – probability of a patient complaining when the duty to
report is not enforced
pCe – probability of a patient complaining when the duty to
report is enforced
pN – Probability that a patient will continue to drive notwithstanding license revocation (in the no-enforcement regime
we assume all patients drive)
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Kt – Increase in accident probability when a person has the
disease and receives treatment pA|t= pAKt where 1 ≤ Kt
Knt – Increase in accident probability when a person has
the disease and does not receive treatment
pA|nt = pAKnt where Kt ≤ Knt and pAKnt ≤ 1

Figure 1: The Model for a Situation without a Duty to Report
According to this model the probability for an accident will
be:
pNoDuty=(1–pM)pA+pMpDrive((1–pCne)pAKnt
+pCne(pDiagnosepAKt +
(1–pDiagnose)pAKnt))

When the duty to report is enforced two parts of the equation change:
1. Instead of pCne (the probability of a patient complaining
when the duty is not enforced) the probability is now pCe (the
probability of a patient complaining when the duty is enforced),
with the latter being smaller or equal to the former.
2. The probability of those drivers who complained and
were diagnosed as having the medical problem is now pN, which
is the probability that they drive although they were diagnosed
with a disqualifying condition. This could be because the physician does not report them, or they decide to drive even though
80
their licenses were cancelled.
80. If we assume that all drivers who will have their drivers’ license re-
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After these changes the revised model now becomes:
pDuty = (1–pM)pA+pMpDrive((1–pCe)pAKnt
+pCe(pDiagnosepA*pN +
(1–pDiagnose)pAKnt))

Equating the two expressions gives:
(1–pM)pA+pMpDrive((1–pCne)pAKnt+pCne(pDiagnosepAKt + (1–pDiagnose)pAKnt))=
(1–pM)pA+pMpDrive((1–pCe)pAKnt+pCe(pDiagnosepApNKt + (1–pDiagnose)pAKnt))

Expanding the expressions and eliminating all joint parts on
both sides:
pCne(Kt – Knt) = pCe(KtpN – Knt)

Which is:

The minimal probability of people seeking medical attention even when the duty is enforced for the law to have a positive effect is therefore:

The expression can be somewhat simplified. For one, we can
assume that any legislation will only be meaningful if pCne is
relatively close to 1. If this probability is low, then most people
with the medical problem will not be seen by a physician, and
the duty to report will have little meaning. Also, we can assume
that pN will be close to 0, i.e., most people who lose their driver’s licenses will cease to drive, considering that driving after a
license was revoked is a misdemeanor in many states and may
lead to fines or jail sentences of various lengths, depending on
81
the state. Assuming pCne = 1 (without the duty to report pavoked will indeed stop driving, then it becomes 0; no accidents will occur. Also,
the model ignores possible accident involvement as pedestrians.
81. See Driving While Revoked, Suspended or Otherwise Unlicensed: Penalties by State, NAT. CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 24, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/driving-while-revoked-suspendedor-otherwise-unli.aspx.
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tients to the state, all patients will complain about their disease) and pN = 0 (all patients whose driver’s license was revoked will stop driving), the expression becomes:

The maximal chilling effect (i.e. the maximal proportion of
people who may fail to report a medical problem in order for the
duty to report to have a positive effect) is 1–pCe. It is possible to
analyze several different cases:
1. Knt = Kt: Assuming that the treatment is not effective in
preventing accidents, that is, that the increase in accident probability when a person has the disease and receives treatment is identical to the increase when it
does not, Knt = Kt, then the right-hand side becomes zero, and no matter how big the chilling effect is (how
small pCe is), it is always efficient to impose a duty.
2. Kt =1: Assuming that the treatment is so effective that
with treatment the disease has no impact on the probability of accidents, then the right-hand side becomes
closer to 1 the larger Knt is. Thus, the larger Knt is, the
more inefficient it is to impose the duty, even if the
chilling effect is small.
3. 1 < Kt < Knt: Here the answer depends on the values of Kt
and Knt. Assuming that the increase in accident probability when a person has the disease and does not receive treatment is fourfold, Knt = 4, and the increase
when she does receive treatment is twofold, Kt = 2, then
at least half [(4-2)/4=.5] of the people with the medical
problem have to complain about their problem for enforcing the duty to report to have the benefit it purported to achieve: reduction in the probability of accidents.
In other words, the chilling effect should not be too
large for the duty to be efficient.
Figure 2 depicts the maximal chilling effect of patients
complaining about the medical problem for the duty to report to
be efficient, assuming Kt = 2 and 4.
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Figure 2: Maximal chilling effect (proportion of people failing to
report a medical problem) when the duty to report is enforced
as a function of the increase of accident likelihood when the
problem is not treated (Knt) for problems that, when treated, increase the accident likelihood two or four times (Kt).
B.

APPLYING THE MODEL TO TORT LAW’S DUTY TO WARN

When applying the model to torts, one can easily see that,
from a social welfare perspective, whether a doctor should be
liable to third parties (the victims of his patient) for not reporting the patients’ condition should be negatively correlated with
the probability that—as a result of imposing the duty on the
doctor—the patient will refrain from receiving treatment. Thus,
the availability of effective treatment and its impact on the
primary behavior of concern, (together with the chilling effect,)
should determine whether a duty should be enforced—not the
severity of the medical problem or the dangerousness it implies
alone. If dementia is not treatable, while epilepsy is, there is a
case on efficiency grounds for imposing a duty to warn identified potential victims of patients with dementia, but to lift it for
potential victims of epileptic patients, if all else (specifically the
chilling effect) is equal.
But what if the victims are not identified? Recall that the
courts in Lipari (shooting in the night club) and Duvall (driving
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with epilepsy) imposed a duty towards unidentifiable victims.
On its face, the dilemma and the solution are the same. The only new component here is that the costs and effectiveness of
warning should also be part of the calculation. Because warning identified victims (like in Tarasoff) is relatively cheap, and
can prevent the harm at relatively low costs, it makes more
sense (holding all else equal) to impose a duty in cases like
Tarasoff than to do so in cases like Lipari or Duvall. For that
reason, it makes sense that physicians will satisfy their duty
towards unidentified victims in torts if they warn the relevant
authorities, even if they do not warn the actual victims.
Duvall and Lipari can, however, be distinguished. In Duvall the court found that the doctor was negligent towards his
own patient (for not warning him to not drive) and the question
was whether liability towards the patient should be extended
towards the patient’s car accident victims. In contrast, in Lipari the duty found was directly towards the shooter’s victims and
not through the patient. Because warning patients not to drive
does not raise problems of chilling effects, there are better reasons to find the doctor liable to his patient’s victims in these
cases. For this reason, it is easier to justify Duvall than Lipari.
The same analysis helps explain Reisner, where the court found
for the plaintiff after the doctor did not warn his patient (the
82
plaintiff’s girlfriend) that she had AIDS.
In contrast, when the doctor does warn his patient about
his dangerousness and the treatment is effective, our model
suggests that physicians might not have a duty to warn even
identified third parties. Indeed, as far as we know, there are no
cases where a court has imposed liability on a physician for
failing to warn a third party whom the physician knows may
have been exposed to HIV by his patient if the patient himself
has already been notified.
Lastly, our model implies that in cases where the policy
maker does not have good data on the effectiveness of treatment with respect to the primary behavior of interest, such as
in cases of psychotherapy, the providers should be left with discretion on whether or not to report his patients. The reason is

82. In Reisner the victim was identifiable, which makes the case for finding against the doctor even stronger. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 519 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
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simple: the provider is in the best position to weigh both the
costs and the benefits of reporting or warning. Accordingly,
mental health professionals should be immune from liability for
negligence, although perhaps not from gross negligence, both
when they warn and when they do not warn the authorities or
third parties. Tarasoff therefore was wrongly decided.
C. APPLYING THE MODEL TO REPORTING STATUTES
Similarly, in the context of state reporting statutes, whether there should be a duty to report (or whether the statute
should be enforced) depends on the context. It might well be
more justifiable to impose a duty to report patients with nontreatable conditions than patients with treatable conditions, so
that those with treatable conditions will not be deterred from
seeking medical help. Methodological difficulties, as well as
ethical concerns, make the study of the efficacy of treatment for
83
medical conditions particularly difficult. Indeed, empirical evidence is not always available, and may be controversial. Yet,
some clear examples for the effectiveness of medical treatment
84
on the primary behavior of concern still exist.
For example, in 2008 Hovinga et al. computed the efficacy
of epilepsy treatment at reducing the risk of motor vehicle acci85
dents amongst those suffering from the disease. The study
featured 408 individuals diagnosed with epilepsy and prescribed anti-epileptic medication and classified each participant
as either adherent patients (n=298) or non-adherent (n=110)
(those who self-reported missing a dose or stopping their medi86
cation in the prior month). The study found that after controlling for confounding variables, the non-adherent participants
had a statistically significant increased chance (OR: 1.92,
p=0.03, CI: 1.07–3.43) of experiencing a motor vehicle accident
87
due to a seizure.

83. See JUDITH CHARLTON ET AL., INFLUENCE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS ON
CRASH INVOLVEMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE DRIVERS 548 (2d ed. 2010), http://
www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/216386/muarc300.pdf.
84. See id. for studies focusing on the efficacy of medical treatment.
85. See Collin A. Hovinga et al., Association of Non-Adherence to Antiepileptic Drugs and Seizures, Quality of Life, and Productivity: Survey of Patients
with Epilepsy and Physicians, 13 EPILEPSY & BEHAV. 316 (2008).
86. Id. at 319.
87. Id. at 319–20.
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Similarly, treatment of sleep apnea through continuous
positive airway pressure (CPAP) has also been shown to result
in a statistically significant decrease in the risk of automobile
accidents. Findley et al. found that a group of fifty participants
with sleep apnea had on average .07 crashes per person in the
two years prior to CPAP treatment, a number which dropped to
zero for those who underwent treatment, but remained un88
changed for those who did not. George found similar results
when analyzing driving records of a control group and 210 par89
ticipants who underwent treatment for sleep apnea. George
noted that for the three years prior to CPAP treatment, participants with sleep apnea had a significantly higher crash rate
90
than the control group. The 182 that underwent continuous
treatment subsequently saw their crash rate fall to the same
level as the control group, whereas the twenty-seven who were
not current CPAP users at the time of the follow-up continued
91
to have a high crash rate relative to the control group.
The effectiveness of current cataract treatment at reducing
crash risk for drivers suffering from the condition was also evi92
dent in a recent study by Owsley et al. The study compared
174 older drivers who had undergone cataract surgery to 103
older drivers suffering from cataracts who had not received
93
treatment. After adjusting for confounding variables, the
crash risk ratio was 0.47, indicating an almost 50% reduction
94
after surgery. Furthermore, the non-surgery group experienced a statistically significant increase in crash prevalence
during the follow-up period, compared to the five years prior to
the study, whereas the treatment group exhibited a modest,
95
non-significant increase.

88. Larry Findley et al., Treatment with Nasal CPAP Decreases Automobile Accidents in Patients with Sleep Apnea, 161 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED., 857, 858 (2000).
89. C.F.P. George, Reduction in Motor Vehicle Collisions Following
Treatment of Sleep Apnoea with Nasal CPAP, 56 THORAX 508, 510 (2001).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Cynthia Owsley et al., Impact of Cataract Surgery on Motor Vehicle Crash Involvement of Older Adults, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 841 (2002).
93. Id. at 844.
94. Id. at 845.
95. Id.
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The efficacy of treatment for the aforementioned conditions
suggests provisionally that a duty to report imposed on physicians should be relaxed for these conditions. In contrast, there
are medical conditions for which treatment has not been shown
to improve patients’ crash risk. In fact, some studies indicated
that treatment may even exacerbate them.
A prime example of this is the case of psychiatric illnesses.
Typically these are treated with prescription medication. While
methodological issues make it difficult to discern whether elevated crash risk is associated with the condition itself or the
prescribed medication, certain drugs used in the treatment of
these conditions have been shown to impair driving ability. In
the case of depression, research has indicated that cyclic antidepressants are associated with a greater risk of injurious
97
crash involvement, and that depressed patients receiving
long-term antidepressant treatment (SSRIs) suffer significant
impairment in their driving abilities as compared to healthy
98
individuals. Benzodiazepines are the most commonly pre99
scribed medication for anxiety disorders and insomnia and
have been shown to impair vision, attention, and motor skills,
100
among other qualities. Studies have shown that benzodiazepine use generally correlates to increased crash risk, at-fault
101
102
crash risk, and a reduction in overall driving capabilities.
The prevalence of benzodiazepine and antidepressant prescriptions and their acknowledged driving-impairing side effects
means that individuals suffering from psychiatric illnesses
treated with these drugs potentially pose a crash risk and thus,
under the model presented in this paper, should potentially be
reported, or treated in other ways.
97. Wayne A. Ray et al., Psychoactive Drugs and the Risk of Injurious Motor Vehicle Crashes in Elderly Drivers, 136 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 873, 877
(1992).
98. Marleen Wingen et al., Driving Impairment in Depressed Patients Receiving Long-Term Antidepressant Treatment, 188 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 84,
87 (2006).
99. See Wayne A. Ray et al., Medications and the Older Driver. 9 CLINICS
GERIATRIC MED. 413, 417 (1993).
100. Id. at 421–22.
101. See F. Barbone et al., Association of Road-Traffic Accidents with Benzodiazepine Use, 352 LANCET 1331, 1334 (1998).
102. James F. O’Hanlon et al., Anxiolytics’ Effects on the Actual Driving
Performance of Patients and Healthy Volunteers in a Standardized Test, 31
NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 81, 85–87 (1995).
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Diabetes is another example of a condition for which research has not shown a conclusive lowering of the risk of traffic
accidents following treatment for individuals suffering from the
103
disease. In fact, there is some evidence that diabetes patients
treated with insulin may actually have a higher crash risk than
104
those with untreated diabetes. Lave et al. determined that
the crash risk for Insulin Dependent Diabetics is 6.1 times
greater than the relative crash risk for Non-Insulin Dependent
105
Diabetics. Despite this finding, the jury on the efficacy of
treatment for diabetes and its resulting effects on crash risk it
still out. Charlton et al., after assessing multiple studies on diabetes and crash risk, determined that the available data is in106
conclusive. However, if Lave et al.’s findings are accurate and
diabetics undergoing insulin therapy are a greater crash risk
than diabetics not on insulin therapy, then under the model
proposed in this paper diabetes should be considered a condition which needs to be reported.
In sum, our model implies that the optimal duty to protect
patients’ privacy depends on empirical data. A 2010 572-page
report by Charlton et al. compiles data from numerous studies
separated by relevant condition or illness, where each has a
section devoted to summarizing research related to the effect of
treatment on crash risk. Our model implies that such data is
relevant for physicians, courts, and policy makers in their determinations regarding the optimal scope of a physician’s duty.
Lastly, our model implies that when the dangerousness of
the primary behavior, Knt, is very high, then the optimal solution might be to enact statutes that effectively increase the
likelihood that patients’ medical condition is discovered (i.e., to
increase pC). In such cases mandatory checkups (e.g. for pilots)
might be warranted. If the treatment is effective, mandatory
“checkup” laws will increase safety by curing more patients. If
the treatment is not effective, mandatory checkup laws will in-

103. See CHARLTON ET AL., supra note 83, at 549.
104. See Larry A. Distiller & Brian D. Kramer, Driving and Diabetics on
Insulin Therapy, 86 SOUTH AFR. MED. J. 1018, 1019 (1996).
105. Lester B. Lave et al., Should Persons with Diabetes Be Licensed to
Drive Trucks?—Risk Management, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 327, 330–31 (1993).
106. See CHARLTON ET AL., supra note 83, at 549.
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crease safety by removing dangerous actors from the public
107
sphere. Indeed, many states have exactly such laws.
CONCLUSION
Many who knew Andreas Lubitz were shocked to hear that
the quiet, polite, and friendly young pilot was responsible for
108
the death of 150 innocent people. As individuals, his friends,
co-workers, and family were understandably limited in their
ability to identify red flags and stop Lubitz before he deliberately crashed Flight 9525. As a society, we certainly have the
tools to prevent another Germanwings-type disaster. However,
any potential solution we engage must concede to the importance of protecting patients’ privacy and related interests,
namely, personal autonomy, individuality, respect, and human
109
dignity or worth.
When discussing the optimal scope of the duty to protect
patients’ privacy, the literature compares two incommensurable interests: privacy and safety. The approach we take in this
paper solves the incommensurability problem. We treat privacy
as important because it is instrumental for effective therapy,
which in turn reduces patients’ risk to society. Thus, we develop a model which finds the optimal balance between protecting
patient privacy (as a means to reduce risk in society) and warning third parties or the state (again as means to reduce risk in
society).
Our model shows that imposing an unqualified duty to report and warn might result in an increase in the dangerousness
of the primary behavior society is concerned about, such as piloting, driving, or violent acts. Thus, the chilling effect and the
107. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE 16:64-7.4 (2015) (requiring maritime pilots
to undergo medical examinations at least annually to check for general health,
vision and hearing); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 363-116-120 (2015) (requiring an
annual general physical examination).
108. Monica Houston-Waesch & Natascha Divac, Mystery Surrounds Possible Motive for Germanwings Co-Pilot Andreas Lubitz, WALL ST. J., http://
www.wsj.com/articles/germanwings-co-pilot-named-as-andreas-lubitz-1427370
009 (last updated Mar. 26, 2015).
109. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1000 (1964); Ruth Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 438, 455 (1980); Robert
C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001); Alan F.
Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970’s, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1022 (1966).
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effectiveness of the medical treatment must be factors that
courts should consider in imposing a duty on medical professionals to warn third parties or a duty to report their patients
to the state. Interestingly, treatment need not eliminate the
risk, nor need it lower the patient’s accident risk to that of a
person without a medical condition. The formula presented
above represents the trade-off at the margin between the benefits of not having a duty (curing the patient and improving his
driving, or assisting patients with violent tendencies) and the
costs of having a duty (patients refraining from going to doctors
and continuing to drive or fly, or patients refraining from seeking mental health care and becoming a danger to themselves
and society).
Thus, holding all else equal, the more effective the treatment for a medical or mental health condition is at reducing
the danger of the primary behavior, the less society should be
willing to impose a duty to report or warn. While the driving or
flying ability of an individual with a serious medical condition
may be significantly worse than that of an individual with no
such medical condition, if the former’s driving or piloting ability
with treatment is significantly better than without treatment,
requiring physicians to report such patients might have an adverse effect. Lastly, whenever it is not clear in advance whether
a specific treatment is effective, such as with psychotherapy,
providers should be left with discretion whether to warn third
parties or report to the state and immune from liability for negligence, although perhaps not from gross negligence.
The decision not to impose a duty to report or warn does not
imply that society should not encourage people to report their
medical problems. Rather, other policy measures, besides enforcing the duty to report or warn, can be used, such as providing people with benefits when reporting, creating social pressure to report, and lowering the negative consequences from
reporting the problem (e.g., in the case of driving, by providing
alternative transportation solutions). These steps are likely to
have desired effects without the negative consequences that
may arise from enforcing the duty to report or warn.

